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Atypical work arrangements have long been criticized as offering more precarious and 
lower paid work than regular open-ended employment. In an important paper published in 
this journal, Booth et al. (2002) were among the first to recognize that notwithstanding 
their potential deficiencies, such jobs also functioned as a stepping stone to permanent 
work. This conclusion proved prescient and has received increasing support in Europe. In 
the present note, we provide a parallel analysis to Booth et al. for the United States – 
somewhat of a missing link in the evolving empirical literature – and obtain not dissimilar 














Atypical  work,  as  its  name  implies,  has  often  been  looked  upon  with  disfavour  by 
economists in terms of the remuneration and career possibilities attaching to temporary 
work of this nature. Indeed, in their introduction to the Economic Journal symposium on 
temporary  jobs,  Booth,  Dolado,  and  Frank  (2002)  summarize  the  thrust  of  the 
contributions as suggesting that the expansion of temporary jobs as a way of increasing 
labour market flexibility may be undesirable. Yet in analyzing the British evidence, Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank (2002) while still concluding that temporary jobs are not desirable 
vis-à-vis open-ended employment temper this judgment with evidence that the main work 
form  they  examine  –  fixed-term  contracts  –  does  provide  a  stepping  stone  to  regular 
employment and carries no long term wage disadvantage for women who start off their 
careers in fixed-term employment. 
Since  the  symposium,  the  stepping-stones  counter  argument  has  if  anything 
gathered  force  (e.g.  Freier  and  Steiner,  2008;  García-Pérez  and  Muñoz-Bullón.  2003; 
Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini, 2004, 2008; Kvasnika, 2008; Portugal and Varajão, 2009; 
Zijl, van den Berg, and Heyma, 2004). That said, the shifting evidence did not dissuade 
the EU from passing the long-delayed third and ‘final’ piece of atypical worker legislation 
in November 2008 covering temporary agency work.
1 Under Directive 2008/104/EC, the 
basic  working  conditions  of  temporary  agency  workers  are  for  the  duration  of  their 
assignment at the user undertaking to be at least equal to those that would obtain had they 
been recruited directly into that job by the undertaking (Official Journal, 2008). This equal 
treatment  principle  is  to  apply  from  the  first  day  of  an  assignment  unless  otherwise 
amended on the basis of agreement between organized labour and capital (so that the 
qualifying period is 12 weeks in the case of the United Kingdom).
2 
Something of a stand-out in the modern literature is the U.S. evidence, which is 
less  developed  than  its  European  counterpart  and  mentioned  only  en  passant  in  the 
symposium.
3 Yet we can use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 
Cohort (NLSY79) to broadly replicate Booth, Francesconi, and Frank’s (2002) wage and 
duration analysis (if not their evaluation of job satisfaction), and provide a useful point of 
contact between the two literatures regarding career prospects. We shall provide evidence   2 
on two categories of atypical workers: temporary workers, comprising temporary agency 
workers  and  direct  hire  temps,  and  the  composite  group  of  contractors/consultants. 
Temporary workers merit special attention in the wake of the recent EU legislation while 
contractors/consultants are of interest because of their earning a wage premium. As we 
shall see, our results for the former category fairly closely accord with those of Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank. 
 
II. Data 
The NLSY79 first began asking workers about their type of working  arrangements in 
1994. The 1994 survey also contains data on the current job as well as retrospective data 
on the last four jobs held up to then. The questions on working arrangement were thence 
continued biennially until the 1998 wave, at which point they were discontinued. (Note 
that  we  can  recoup  the  working  arrangements  between  these  three  waves  from  data 
contained in the respondents’ work histories.) Using this information from the NLSY79, 
we  extracted  two  datasets.  The  first  uses  information  from  the  1994,  1996  and  1998 
surveys,
4 including their retrospective content, to construct the pathways and durations of 
jobs held by respondents from 1992 onwards.
 The second sample uses the 1993 to 1998 
waves of the NLSY79 for the analysis of wage development.
5   
  We can identify two principal forms of atypical work in the NLSY79: ‘temporary 
workers’  and  contractors/consultants.  The  former  category  comprises  the  separate 
categories of temporary agency workers and direct hire temporaries that we amalgamate 
on sample size grounds.
6 Information on contractors and consultants is not separated out 
in the survey and is therefore a composite grouping to begin with. Another potential group 
of atypical workers, termed ‘other work types,’ can be identified in the survey. Since 
members of this group are disproportionately self-employed individuals, the decision was 
taken to exclude them. (We note parenthetically that a wider array of atypical jobs is 
available  in  the  other  main  data  set  available  to  U.S.  researchers  in  this  area:  the 
Contingent  and  Alternative  Employment  Arrangement  Supplement  (CAEAS)  to  the 
Current Population Survey. Unfortunately use of this material is precluded because we can 
at best identify worker histories for eighteen months.)   3 
Using  the  data  for  our  first  sample  identified  above,  we  are  able  to  trace  the 
pathways used by workers engaged in temporary work over interval, 1992-98. Using the 
three main surveys and their retrospective components, we can identify the sequence of 
jobs and the associated work arrangements held by workers over this not inconsiderable 
interval.  This  sequencing  provides  us  with  some  guidance  as  to  whether  temporary 
employment  serves  as  a  potential  stepping  stone  into  regular  employment  and  of  the 
employee characteristics that underpin such transitions. For each job held by workers, we 
also identify its industrial and occupational affiliation, the size of the employment unit, 
and the status of the job as either part-time or full-time. We use the demographic and other 
characteristics (e.g. age, education, region, ethnicity, etc.) of the worker at the time of each 
NLSY  interview  (1994,  1996  and  1998)  to  estimate  their  potential  impact  on  job 
transitions; while for those transitions that take place between waves we take the worker 
characteristics recorded in the earlier survey (i.e. for different jobs). 
Our  second  sample  allows  us  to  estimate  the  medium-term  implications  of 
temporary and contract work employment on a worker’s wages. Like Booth, Francesconi, 
and Frank, we are able to identify the total number of temporary and contracting jobs held 
by a worker over the sample period, 1993-98. But we also seek to improve upon this 
measure by recording the number of years spent in either type of atypical employment on 
the grounds that worker remuneration is more likely to be impacted by a prolonged period 
of time spent in an atypical job – and, in particular, temporary employment – rather than 
just  the  frequency  of  such  jobs.  The  wage  data  pertain  to  the  primary  job  held  by  a 
respondent  at  the  time  of  each  NLSY  interview.  Note  further  that  we  included  those 
temporary or contracting jobs starting and ending between any two waves in our measure 
of the time spent in atypical work. For temporal consistency, the wages of such jobs were 
not used in our wage analysis. 
  For both samples, we include information on the total amount of general labour 
market experience accrued by a worker since 1975 as a measure of accumulated (general) 
human capital and examine its implications for wage development and job transitions. We 
also constructed proxies for a worker’s ability using the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
results reported in the 1981 NLSY. Specifically, proxies for a worker’s mathematical, 
verbal, practical and scientific ability were constructed by using the test results for these   4 
general areas and then collecting the residuals obtained from the regression of scores on a 
vector of age and education dummies.  
Descriptive information  on the remuneration and characteristics of our  atypical 
workers  is  provided  in  Table  1.  Slightly  less  than  13,500  jobs  were  recorded  by  the 
NLSY79 respondents over the period 1993-1998. From panel (a) of the table it can be 
seen that a little over 6 percent of all jobs held were temporary, whereas contracting or 
consulting positions were less than 2 percent of the total. The frequency of these two 
atypical work arrangements is slightly lower in our sample than for the U.S. workforce as 
a whole because of the older cohort of workers contained in the NLSY79 sample (see 
Cohany, 1998). 
(Table 1 near here) 
  Panel (b) of Table 1 presents information on the inflation-adjusted average hourly 
wages  of  the  three  groups,  while  panel  (c)  provides  t-tests  of  the  respective  wage 
differences. Temporary workers appear to fare poorly relative to those employed in either 
regular  work  or  contracting/consulting.  The  $4.80  differential  reported  for  the  whole 
sample represents a 45 percent wage disparity between temporary and regular work, and 
captures the much greater earnings penalty applying in the case of men than women. All 
wage  differences  between  temporary  and  regular  workers  (and  contracting/consulting 
workers) are statistically significant. When we compare contracting/consulting workers 
with regular workers, however, the broad earnings picture is reversed, although only in the 
case of females is the now favourable earnings gap (of almost $4) statistically significant. 
(Table 2 near here) 
Table 2 presents information on job durations (panel (a)) and job pathways (panel 
(b)) over the 1992 to 1998 waves of NLSY79 data, with data from the 2000 wave being 
used to update the former information. Kaplan-Meier estimates of both completed and 
incomplete durations of the various work arrangements reveal that fully fifty percent of 
temporary jobs are completed within six months for both males and females. The median 
duration for contracting/consulting work at 1.83 years (1.7 years for males and 1.9 years 
for females) was more than twice that of temporary employment. Open-ended jobs had a 
median duration of just under three years for both males and females. Only four (two)   5 
percent of male (female) temporary jobs lasted more than five years as compared with 
almost 40 percent in the case of regular jobs. 
As  for  the  pathways,  slightly  more  than  one-half  of  temporary  and 
contracting/consulting workers remained in the same work arrangement over the sample 
period. Unsurprisingly, of those who transitioned out of either atypical work arrangement, 
regular employment rather than another form of atypical work was the preferred path: 48 
percent  of  the  agency  temps  and  45  percent  of  contractors/consultants  subsequently 
entered open-ended employment. The transition rates out of regular work show that this is 
a highly stable work arrangement: more that 96 percent of all those initially in regular 
employment either took another regular job or remained in the same job across all seven 
years of the sample period. 
With these preliminaries behind us, what is the cet. par. evidence on transitions 
and wage development? 
 
III. Findings  
We have seen that the majority of atypical workers transition into permanent employment. 
But what type of  workers are they? To address this issue, we specify  a discrete time 
proportional  hazard  model  in  the  manner  of  Booth,  Francesconi,  and  Frank,  linking 
transitions into open-ended employment to a number of individual attributes, including 
AFQT  scores,  and  job  specific  characteristics.  The  model  is  estimated  for  temporary 
agency  workers  alone  because  small  sample  size  prohibited  estimation  in  the  case  of 
contractors/consultants.  Although  the  covariates  are  not  identical  as  between  our  two 
studies, the results make sense in general and are relatively consistent with the findings of 
the British study.  
(Table 3 near here) 
Thus,  from  Table  3,  we  see  age  –  here  a  continuous  rather  than  a  categorical 
variable – is strongly negatively associated with transitions into open-ended employment 
and for both genders (whereas this is the case for males alone in Britain). The coefficient 
estimate for schooling – again a continuous rather than a categorical variable here – is 
positive throughout. That said, it is not statistically significant for females. Interestingly, 
black  male  temporary  workers  have  a  heightened  probability  of  exiting  into  regular   6 
employment than their white counterparts whereas the opposite is true for Hispanics of 
both  genders,  even  if  this  latter  result  is  only  marginally  significant  for  females.  The 
incorporation of AFQT scores is somewhat disappointing. Although higher verbal ability 
improves  the  chances  of  exiting  from  temporary  work  into  regular  employment  for 
females, this is not true for males for whom the coefficient estimate is negative albeit 
statistically insignificant. For its part, practical ability appears to detract from transitioning 
into  regular  employment  for  females.  Unlike  the  British  case,  part-time  status  has  no 
adverse effect on transition rates. Nor for that matter is employer size related to transitions 
into regular employment, which might suggest that it is not only large employers that use 
temporary employment as a screen. The contribution of industrial affiliation is statistically 
insignificant throughout with the one exception of the personal services sector. Males in 
this  sector  are  less  likely  to  transition  into  regular  employment.  Interestingly,  Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank obtain the same result for the ‘protection and personal services’ 
occupation in respect of casual (if not fixed-term) work. Finally, none of our occupational 
coefficients proved statistically significant. 
To what extent do the large wage gaps between regular, open-ended employment 
and temporary work observed for males and females, but especially the former, reflect 
differential human capital endowments and the like. In Table 4 we report simple OLS 
regressions to measure the effects of such factors on log wages. Our regressors include 
those used earlier in modeling (temporary) worker transitions into regular employment. 
They are augmented in the manner of Booth Francsconi, and Frank, to include labour 
market experience. The authors measure experience as over the survey period; we measure 
it as time spent in employment since 1976, as this more accurately captures a workers true 
workforce experience, and, as a result, is a better reflection of how experience impacts 
wages. Following Booth et al., we also include linear and quadratic number of previous 
jobs held (i.e. the number of temporary jobs and the number of contracting/consulting 
jobs) as well as interactions between each and lifetime experience to determine whether 
the returns to experience differ by contract type. 
(Table 4 near here) 
Table 4 presents summary results of our wage regressions.
7 The basic result is that, 
after  controlling  for  human  capital,  observed  ability,  and  demographic,  industrial  and   7 
occupational  differences,  atypical  work  appears  to  have  few  adverse  implications  for 
female earnings over the 1993-98 interval, while unfavourably impacting males earnings. 
  Focusing on the separate findings for males and females, and beginning with the 
results in column (3) of the table, we see that each temporary job held by males serves to 
reduce wages, by very roughly twenty-one percent, when compared to those males who 
never held a temporary job. The coefficient estimate for the quadratic term suggests that 
this gap falls with the number of jobs taken over the five-year interval. Observe that the 
estimated  cet.  par.  differential  is  around  one-half  that  of  the  crude  wage  gap  earlier 
reported in Table 1, suggesting that a good portion of the wage disadvantage for males in 
temporary  employment  can be attributable to other observed characteristics. There  are 
seemingly  modest  differences  between  the  wages  of  males  employed  in 
contracting/consulting  work  and  those  of  their  counterparts  in  regular  employment. 
Finally,  there  is  the  general  result  that  additional  years  of  general  labour  market 
experience  have  positive  implications  for  wages  development:  each  year  of  additional 
lifetime experience increases earnings by approximately five percent. 
  The results presented in the next column of the table look beyond the latter finding 
in providing estimates of any differential effect of atypical work on experience capital. 
Given the transitory nature of temporary jobs, it might not be unexpected to see a lesser 
return  vis-à-vis  open-ended  employment.  Although  the  coefficient  estimates  for  the 
interaction terms are statistically insignificant, for male workers with one year of lifetime 
experience the implied penalty to one temporary job over the first six years of the career is 
approximately 25.1% falling to 16.4% with ten years experience. For male contracting/ 
consulting workers the corresponding values are a premium of 27.5% falling to a penalty 
of 4.1%. In the case of females a premium is implied for one atypical job over the first six 
years of a career, although as can be seen from column (5) of the table this declines for 
temporary and contracting/consulting workers with ten years of experience, and is actually 
reversed (i.e. becomes a penalty) in the case of temporaries. 
  In focusing on the number of atypical jobs held by a worker to derive the above 
results,  we  are  not  accounting  directly  for  the  actual  time  spent  in  such  work 
arrangements.  As  an  extreme  example,  consider  two  workers  one  of  whom  takes  a 
temporary  job  as  a  (certain)  stepping  stone  into  regular  employment  while  the  other   8 
spends the entire six-year period in the same temporary job. Both workers will record only 
one temporary job, but it seems unlikely that this would have the same effect on each 
worker’s  earnings.  To  investigate  this  issue,  we  further  exploited  the  work  diaries 
maintained by the NLSY79 respondents to derive a measure of the number of years spent 
in each type of atypical employment. We then substituted this measure for the number of 
jobs argument(s). Summary findings of our re-estimations are contained in Table 5. 
(Table 5 near here) 
As  was  the  case  in  Table  4,  spending  time  in  temporary  employment  is  more 
detrimental for males. The results obtained in the column (3) of Table 5 indicate that each 
year spent by a male in temporary work reduces his earnings by about 15%, although the 
coefficient estimate for the quadratic term again suggests that there is some mitigation of 
this wage penalty over the employment interval. For females, the results given in column 
(5) of the table indicate that temporary employment plays even less of a role than before in 
the determination of their earnings once other observed differences are taken into account. 
Focusing on the results in columns (4) and (6), however, we can see  that the cost of 
working  as  a  temporary  worker  for  one  year  results  in  a  continuing  penalty  for  both 
genders. For males, the penalty is 23.8% after a year falling modestly to 17.1% after ten 
years. But for females the penalty is just 3.25% after one year and 0.95% after ten years. 
There  is  no  such  continuing  penalty  in  the  case  of  one  year’s  employment  in 
contracting/consulting job. For males there is actually a premium (of 24.7% after one year 
falling to 4.6% after ten years). For females there is even some suggestion of a penalty 
being transformed into a modest premium (from -14.4% after one year to 3.5% after ten 
years). 
(Figures 1 and 2 near here) 
The effects of different contract types on wages can be explored diagrammatically 
by describing wage paths for a number of career choices. Again using the coefficient 
estimates  in  Tables  4  and  5,  we  construct  four  such  synthetic  profiles  for  males  and 
females. Profile 1 describes the case where the worker is employed in a permanent job 
throughput the sample period. Profile 2 (3) depicts a situation in which the worker holds a 
temporary (contracting/consulting) job in the first period, followed by employment in a 
permanent job therereafter. Finally, profile 4 is the case where the worker holds three   9 
temporary jobs before transitioning into permanent employment. These wage trajectories 
are reproduced in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. 
Beginning  with  the  specification  based  on  the  number  of  atypical  jobs,  it  is 
apparent from Figure 1 that male contracting and consulting workers are a cut above the 
rest and conversely for their fellows in temporary jobs. That is, workers who take either 
one or three temporary jobs before transitioning into regular open-ended employment earn 
less and continue to earn less than their counterparts in continuous regular employment, 
the gap between them narrowing only very slowly over time. It is as if the number of 
temporary  jobs  directly  proxies  unobserved  differences  in  ability.  As  far  as  male 
consulting/contracting jobs are concerned, no earnings benefit accrues to switching out of 
this type of atypical work into regular employment since the earnings gap favoring former 
contracting/consulting workers narrows through time although it certainly persists over the 
time frame considered in the figure. 
The  picture  for  women  is  somewhat  different.  Most  obviously  the  structure  is 
much less dispersed and the gaps between profiles less pronounced. Points of contact with 
the male trajectories are, first, that former contracting/consulting workers continue to earn 
the most, although the gap between them and regular workers narrows, and, second, that 
those with three temporary jobs before they transition into regular employment continue to 
earn  distinctly  less  than  regular  workers  and  actually  deteriorate  relatively.  The  main 
difference,  then,  is  that  those  with  one  temporary  job  who  transition  into  regular 
employment  seemingly  earn  more  than  ever-regular  workers  to  begin  with  but  are 
subsequently overtaken by them. That said, the earnings gaps in question are very modest. 
With the possible exception of profile 4 types, there is little to suggest in the female case 
that number of temporary jobs might proxy unobserved heterogeneity. 
Figure 2 replaces the number of jobs measure with time spent in atypical jobs. The 
earnings profiles shown for males fairly closely follow those reported earlier in Figure 1. 
That is to say there is no indication that switching out of temporary work into regular 
work  is  associated  with  catch  up,  while  the  earnings  advantage  of  former 
consulting/contracting  workers  is  now  subject  to  less  erosion.  As  far  as  females  are 
concerned, however, there is much stronger evidence of catch up in the wake of transitions 
from one or three temporary jobs into regular employment. And for this specification,   10 
those  transitioning  from  contracting/consulting  work  display  the  sharpest  earnings 
progression of all, albeit from the lowest starting point. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Reflecting data considerations, there has been rather less investigation of the nature and 
consequences of atypical work in the United States than in Europe. Of late, this imbalance 
has if anything grown. Partly for this reason, the extant U.S. evidence on the implications 
of atypical work for employment continuity and wages is also more polarized, with some 
observers continuing to characterize atypical work as providing dead end jobs with poor 
wages and prospects and others seeing them more as stepping stones to permanent or at 
least regular employment. The caveat is that some atypical jobs in the United States have 
always been regarded as paying well, even offering a premium over regular, open-ended 
employment.  
In  this  note,  we  have  sought  to  offer  a  fresh  view  of  the  U.S.  evidence  by 
examining job transitions and wage development for two atypical jobs at either end of the 
wage  continuum:  temporary  workers,  comprising  agency  and  direct  hire  temps,  and 
consulting/contracting  workers.  In  this  endeavour  we  have  drawn  directly  on  Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank’s (2002) important study of workers on fixed-term contracts and 
those in casual and seasonal jobs, published as part of an EJ symposium on temporary 
work in Europe. Although we are unable to investigate the job satisfaction enjoyed by 
temporary workers or examine their training opportunities as do these authors, we can 
broadly  replicate their treatment of the effects  of temporary work on career prospects 
subject to the limitations of the U.S. data. 
  And we report a real measure of support for Booth, Francsconi, and Frank with 
respect  to  our  (different)  category  of  temporary  workers,  while  at  the  same  time 
confirming  past  research  on  the  more  privileged  position  of  contracting/consulting 
workers. That is to say, on the negative side we find that male temps suffer a material cet. 
par.  wage  disadvantage  that  persists  with  only  very  slight  sign  of  narrowing  after  the 
transition into regular work More positively, the situation confronting female temporary 
workers is much brighter, also in line with Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, at least for our   11 
preferred measure of time spent in atypical work. The difference in our case is that there is 
less evidence of a wage penalty to begin with.  
At  a  descriptive  level,  temporary  jobs  are  indeed  stepping  stones  to  regular 
employment.  But  unobserved  differences  in  worker  quality  seemingly  lie  behind  the 
finding that males who enter regular employment after one or more spells of temporary 
work close the  gap  at a glacial rate.  For females on the other hand any  earnings  gap 
associated with taking temporary jobs before entering regular employment is modest to 
begin with and narrows over time. There is only the slenderest of evidence pointing to 
unobserved  quality  differences  between  females  in  atypical  employment  and  their 

























1. Atypical worker directives dealing with part-timers, fixed-term contract workers, and 
agency temps were first mooted in the early 1980s but draft legislation covering the first 
two groups was not enacted into law until in the late 1990s (see Official Journal, 1998, 
1999,  respectively).  Legislation  on  agency  workers  has  proved  altogether  more 
controversial  given the diversity of law and custom practice within the EU. Thus, for 
example, the present legislation was first proposed by the Commission in 2002.  Final 
passage  of  the  draft  legislation  some  six  years  later  hinged  on  a  mix  of  external  and 
internal  concessions.  The  former  included  British  opt-outs  on  yet  more  controversial 
legislation in the form of the ultimately abortive working hours’ directive. Among the 
internal concessions, apart from the derogation noted in the text, was the exemption from 
equal treatment in respect of pay where agency temps having a permanent employment 
contract with their agency continued to be paid between assignments.   
2. By the same token, member states are to review existing restrictions or prohibitions of 
the use of temporary  agency workers – presumably including limits on the sectors or 
special situations in which temporary agency workers can be used or on the maximum 
duration of assignments – in order to verify that they are justified on grounds of health and 
safety ‘or the need to ensure that the labour market functions properly and abuses are 
prevented.’ Note that these provisions, however, do not cover national requirements on the 
registration, licensing, certification, financial guarantees or monitoring of temporary work 
agencies. 
3. But for a review of the U.S. atypical worker wage literature, see Addison and Surfield 
(2007).  
4. In addition, data from the 2000 wave is used to update the durations of jobs held by 
respondents in 1998; see Table 2. 
5. For our second sample, we do not go back further than 1993 given the progressive loss 
of data on both pay and work type prior to this wave of the NLSY79. We can go a little 
further back in the case of out first sample because we are not concerned with wage data 
but only jobs.   13 
6. See Addison and Surfield (2009) on the efficacy of this aggregation. 
7.    A  number  of  regressors  in  our  wage  equation  are  likely  to  be  correlated  with 
unobserved individual and job-specific characteristics. Unfortunately, given insufficient 
variation in the number of jobs held by respondents, we were unable to fully instrument 
for potentially endogenous variables in the manner of Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (see 
their IV/GLS estimates in Table 6).  We recognize that this is a limitation of this part of 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Temporary and Contracting/Consulting Work and Mean Hourly Wages by 
Type of Contract and Gender (wages in constant 1982-84 dollars) 
 
 
  Whole Sample  Males  Females 
 
(a) Atypical Work [%] 
 
Temporary Workers  6.17%  5.69%  6.68% 
Contractors/Consultants  1.79%  2.17%  1.39% 
N  13,420  6,851  6,569 
 
(b) Hourly Wages [$] 
 
Regular Workers (RW)  10.79  12.82  8.59 
Temporary Workers (TW)  5.96  6.38  5.61 
Contractors/Consultants (C/C)13.36  13.77  12.54 
 
(c) Wage Differences 
 
RW – TW  4.82***  6.44**  2.98*** 
  (2.78)  (1.98)  (3.18) 
 
RW – C/C  -2.57  -0.95  03.95** 
  (1.36)  (0.29)  (2.32) 
 
TW – C/C  -7.40***  -7.40***  -6.93*** 
  (7.58)  (5.16)  (4.74) 
 
 
Source: NLSY79, 1993-98. 
Notes: Wages are expressed in constant 1982-84 dollars. Absolute values of the t-test of 
the  wage  differences  are  in  parentheses;  ***,  **  indicating  that  the  difference  is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
   17 
 
Table 2 
Labor Market States, Employment Duration and Transition Rates 
 
 
(a) Employment Duration, by Work Arrangement 
 
 
  Regular Workers  Temporary Workers Contractors/Consultants 
 
Average, in years  5.04  1.18  2.60 
(standard deviation)  (5.43)  (1.68)  (2.51) 
 




(b) Transition Rates, by Work Arrangement 
 
    Next or Ending Work Arrangement 
 
Initial Arrangement    Regular Work    Temporary Work   Contracting/Consulting 
 
Regular Work  11,918 (96.49%)  340 (2.75%)  94 (0.76%) 
 
Temporary Work  399 (48.19%)  421 (50.85%)  8 (0.87%) 
 
Contracting/Consulting  108 (45.00%)  8 (3.33%)  124 (51.67%) 
 
N     12,425 (92.59%)        769 (5.73%)        226 (1.68%) 
 
 
Source: NLSY79, 1992-98. 
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Table 3 
Exit from Temporary Agency Work to Regular Work 
(Estimates from a proportional hazard model, non-parametric baseline hazard specification) 
   
Transition from Temporary to Regular Employment  
  Men  Women 
Variables  (1)  (3) 
     
Individual Characteristics   
Age    -0.328***  -0.279*** 
  (0.0512)  (0.0390) 
Education  0.105*  0.0188 
  (0.0582)  (0.0622) 
Black  0.700**  0.228 
  (0.310)  (0.266) 
Hispanic  -0.428  -0.589* 
  (0.360)  (0.349) 
Married  0.336  -0.129 
  (0.228)  (0.230) 
AFQT Scores:     
Verbal ability  -0.148  0.584*** 
  (0.224)  (0.215) 
Math ability  -0.0839  0.0145 
  (0.195)  (0.211) 
Practical ability  0.305  -0.558* 
  (0.219)  (0.291) 
Coding ability  0.137  -0.0910 
  (0.156)  (0.131) 
     
Job Characteristics   
Part-time  -0.0597  0.00766 
  (0.265)  (0.225) 
Employer Size  8.03e-06  -9.81e-07 
  (6.85e-06)  (6.22e-06) 
Regional location   
North East  -0.748**  -0.497 
  (0.374)  (0.396) 
South  -0.344  -0.0549 
  (0.290)  (0.249) 
West  0.122  0.145 
  (0.336)  (0.336) 
North Central 
a  a 
       19 
Industrial Sector     
Agriculture  -1.090  0.185 
  (1.444)  (0.691) 
Mining  -1.069  0.587 
  (1.345)  (0.961) 
Manufacturing  -1.237  -0.189 
  (1.341)  (0.619) 
Transport./  -1.170  0.634 
Comm.  (1.454)  (0.656) 
Trade  -1.298  0.267 
  (1.391)  (0.556) 
Business Service  -0.898  0.407 
  (1.309)  (0.594) 
Professional   -1.140  0.0981 
Service  (1.372)  (0.573) 
Personal Service  -2.602*  -0.766 
  (1.494)  (0.641) 
Public   -1.327  0.0964 
Administration  (1.372)  (0.633) 
FIRE 
a  a 
     
Employment Capacity   
Managerial  -0.0147  -0.477 
  (0.680)  (0.537) 
Clerical  0.580  -0.00606 
  (0.911)  (0.432) 
Service  0.480  0.626 
  (0.709)  (0.459) 
Operator/  0.341  0.0212 
Laborer  (0.701)  (0.464) 
Skilled laborer  0.0526  0.176 
  (0.746)  (0.564) 
Technical/Sales 
a  a 
     
Log-likelihood  -415.4  -485.8 
χ
2  120.74  92.38 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
N  192  236 
Notes:  Robust  standard  errors  are  given  in  parentheses.  Standard  errors  have  been  clustered  by  the 
individual. The model χ
2 statistic has 28 degrees of freedom and its p-value is shown in brackets. Ability 
scores were obtained by taking the scores reported by the respondents in the 1981 AFQT and regressed on a 
vector of age and education dummies. The residuals are represented in these variables. The test scores were 
combined into one of four types of ability: verbal, mathematical, practical, and coding ability. 
a indicates 
excluded group. Estimation was also performed with gamma-distributed latent random effects in order to 
capture unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. Since the gamma variance parameter converged to 
zero,  results  of  this  procedure  are  not  reported  here,  but  are  available  upon  request.    ***,**,*  denote 




Impact of Temporary and Contract Work Spells on Log Wages, Summary Results 
  Whole Sample  Men  Women 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
No. Temporary Jobs  (NTJ)  -0.139***  -0.0878  -0.230***  -0.313*  -0.0654*  0.0432 
  (0.0318)  (0.0788)  (0.0485)  (0.183)  (0.0372)  (0.0623) 
No. Temporary Jobs
2  0.0198  0.0169  0.0486**  0.0438**  -0.00258  -0.00522 
  (0.0145)  (0.0150)  (0.0220)  (0.0221)  (0.0140)  (0.0139) 
NTJ*lifetime experience    -0.00494    0.0193    -0.0191* 
    (0.0118)    (0.0280)    (0.0105) 
NTJ*lifetime experience
2    8.00e-05    -0.000884    0.000747 
    (0.000454)    (0.000989)    (0.000461) 
No. Contract/Consult. Jobs (NCJ)  -0.0747  0.125  -0.139  0.223  0.134  0.134 
  (0.0893)  (0.181)  (0.109)  (0.280)  (0.164)  (0.234) 
No. Contract/ Consult. Jobs
2  0.0837  0.0904*  0.102*  0.108*  -0.0351  -0.00712 
  (0.0528)  (0.0527)  (0.0579)  (0.0590)  (0.109)  (0.114) 
NCJ*lifetime experience    -0.0412    -0.0585    -0.0262 
    (0.0370)    (0.0542)    (0.0358) 
NCJ*lifetime experience
2    0.00173    0.00213    0.00161 
    (0.00155)    (0.00224)    (0.00130) 
Current lifetime experience  0.0526***  0.0545***  0.0526***  0.0533***  0.0465***  0.0489*** 
  (0.00412)  (0.00442)  (0.00665)  (0.00720)  (0.00514)  (0.00550) 
Current lifetime experience
2  -0.00055***  -0.00062***  -0.00072***  -0.00073***  -0.00037*  -0.00047** 
  (0.00015)  (0.00016)  (0.00023)  (0.00024)  (0.00019)  (0.00020) 
Constant  0.865***  0.856***  0.806***  0.805***  0.792***  0.776*** 
  (0.0862)  (0.0864)  (0.126)  (0.126)  (0.116)  (0.116) 
             
R
2  0.378  0.378  0.344  0.344  0.417  0.417 
Observations  14138  7826  6312 
Individuals  4731  2516  2215 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Each specification also includes dummy variables for region, race, ethnicity, marital status, part-time 
status, occupation, industry, firm size, and proxies for ability/aptitude derived from AFQT scores, as well as a measure of worker age. All robust standard errors 
are listed in parentheses.  ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.    21 
 
Table 5 
Impact of Time in Temporary and Contract Work on Log Wages, Summary Results 
  Whole Sample  Men  Women 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
No. Years in Temporary Jobs (YTJ)  -0.0968***  -0.0805  -0.167***  -0.262**  -0.0111  -0.0329 
  (0.0218)  (0.0737)  (0.0320)  (0.122)  (0.0516)  (0.109) 
No. Years in Temporary Jobs
 2  0.00826***  0.00839***  0.0150***  0.0144***  -0.00575  -0.00495 
  (0.00249)  (0.00269)  (0.00324)  (0.00362)  (0.0191)  (0.0187) 
YTJ *lifetime experience    -0.00247    0.00949    0.00560 
    (0.0108)    (0.0176)    (0.0132) 
YTJ *lifetime experience
2    8.42e-05    -0.000179    -0.000276 
    (0.000363)    (0.000595)    (0.000417) 
No. Years in Contract Jobs (YCJ)  0.0551  -0.00233  0.0279  0.288*  0.0526  -0.179 
  (0.0339)  (0.0961)  (0.0363)  (0.156)  (0.0714)  (0.144) 
No. Years in Contract Jobs
 2  -0.0111  -0.0114  -0.0115*  -0.00963  0.00445  0.00696 
  (0.00893)  (0.00903)  (0.00664)  (0.00695)  (0.0220)  (0.0185) 
YCJ *lifetime experience    0.00739    -0.0333*    0.0285 
    (0.0126)    (0.0196)    (0.0200) 
YCJ *lifetime experience
2    -0.000214    0.000998*    -0.000775 
    (0.000421)    (0.000604)    (0.000753) 
Current lifetime experience  0.0529***  0.0526***  0.0541***  0.0550***  0.0482***  0.0458*** 
  (0.00401)  (0.00408)  (0.00652)  (0.00663)  (0.00508)  (0.00516) 
Current lifetime experience
2  -0.00056***  -0.00055***  -0.00072***  -0.00076***  -0.00043**  -0.00035* 
  (0.00014)  (0.00014)  (0.00022)  (0.00022)  (0.00019)  (0.00019) 
Constant  0.817***  0.819***  0.685***  0.678***  0.834***  0.849*** 
  (0.0765)  (0.0766)  -0.167***  (0.113)  (0.104)  (0.104) 
             
R
2  0.383  0.383  0.351  0.351  0.416  0.416 
Observations  15949  8688  7258 
Individuals  4811  2553  2258 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Each specification also includes dummy variables for region, race, marital status, part-time 
status, occupation, industry, firm size, and proxies for ability/aptitude derived from AFQT scores, as well as a measure of worker age. All robust 
standard  errors  are  listed  in  parentheses.  ***,**,*  denote  statistical  significance  at  the  0.01,  0.05,  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.   22 
 
Notes: Predictions based on the estimates provided in Table 4. Pattern 1: Worker is always employed in a 
permanent job. Pattern 2: Worker holds one temporary job in first period and is employed in permanent 
employment  thereafter.  Pattern  3:  Worker  holds  one  contracting/consulting  job  and  is  employed  in 
permanent employment thereafter. Pattern 4: Worker holds three temporary jobs and then is employed in 
permanent employment.   23 
Notes: Predictions based on the estimates provided in Table 5. Pattern 1: Worker is always employed in a 
permanent job. Pattern 2: Worker employed as a temporary worker in first year and is employed in 
permanent employment thereafter. Pattern 3: Worker employed in contracting/consulting job in first year 
and is employed in permanent employment thereafter. Pattern 4: Worker holds three years of temporary 
employment and then is employed in permanent employment. ESTUDOS DO G.E.M.F. 
(Available  on-line at http://gemf.fe.uc.pt) 
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